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In Metaphysics A 3, Aristotle undertakes to confirm his system of the four causes 
as a framework for inquiry into first principles, the knowledge of which will 
constitute wisdom. His strategy will be to survey his philosophical predecessors, 
in order to establish that none has supplied a cause which cannot be subsumed 
under his own canonical four. Thus A 3 inaugurates a project not completed 
until the end of A 6—or, taken more inclusively, A 10, since A 7 summarizes 
its results, chapters 8 and 9 develop criticisms of some of the views discussed, 
and chapter 10 reads as a summation of the whole.1 (Much of Metaphysics α also 
reads, appropriately enough, like a series of reflections on this project: I will 
note its relevance on occasion below.) 
Our concern here is with the opening phase of this project. Here Aris-
totle discusses the steps taken by the earliest philosophers and their successors 
towards determining the material cause, which led in turn to recognizing its 
inadequacy as sole first principle [archê]. I divide the text of A 3, 983a24-4b8 
into five moves: (1) the introduction of the project (983a24-3b6); (2) the account 
of the reasoning of the first philosophers (983b6-20); (3) a discussion of Thales, 
with an excursus on his putative predecessors among the poets (983b20-4a5); (4) 
* I would like to thank all the participants in the Symposium Aristotelicum meeting for discussion 
of this paper, as well as Victor Caston, Nathan Gilbert, Phillip Horky, Brad Inwood, Stephen Menn, and 
Robin Smith for their comments. My thanks also to Matthew Siebert for bibliographic assistance, and 
to Nathan Gilbert for some extremely helpful editorial interventions.
1 I shall be agnostic as to how strongly we should distinguish A 8-9 or A 8-10 as a distinct project 
from A 3-6 or A 3-7, and will often refer with deliberate ambiguity to ‘A 3ff ’. See John Cooper’s paper 
in this volume for a full analysis of these structural relations, and Frede 2004 for a very helpful account 
of the underlying agenda and assumptions of Metaph. A.  
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a survey of candidate material causes up to and including those of Anaxagoras 
(984a5-16); and (5) an account of early steps towards discovery of the moving 
cause (984a16-4b8). I will work through this programme in order, but will not 
attempt to engage with every question it raises, especially ones more fully dealt 
with elsewhere. For instance, I will not be discussing the implications of Aristo-
tle’s brief references here to Parmenides, Empedocles and Anaxagoras, in light 
of his more extended discussions later on.2 My primary concern throughout 
will be with the general strategies and methods Aristotle here adopts, and in 
relation to each section of text, I will be arguing for a particular claim: (1) that 
the argument of A 3ff. is a complex and perhaps unique exercise in ‘negative 
corroborative dialectic’; (2) that Aristotle may attribute to the earliest philoso-
phers a weaker and more plausible version of material monism than is usually 
thought; (3) that much of Aristotle’s account of Thales is drawn from Hippo, 
via the doxography of the sophist Hippias; (4) that Aristotle’s recounting of the 
various candidate material causes is shaped by Plato’s proto-doxographic dis-
cussions in the Sophist; and (5) that his turn to the moving cause is marked by 
an unusual and important progressivist thesis, the ‘internal logic’ claim. 
In a concluding section (VI), I try to put together the methodological pieces, 
and in particular consider whether Metaph. A 3 should count as a kind of ‘his-
tory of philosophy’. This is a controversial question, and accounts of Metaph. A 
often include a disclaimer of the phrase.3 (My concern here is with the term 
‘history’ rather than ‘philosophy’: how far Aristotle’s predecessors were engaged 
in a project rightly called ‘philosophy’ is another question altogether.)4 This is 
sometimes meant to either excuse or dismiss Aristotle for failing to meet the 
2 Cf. especially Gabor Betegh’s discussion of Anaxagoras and Empedocles in A 3-4.
3 The locus classicus is the highly influential Cherniss 1935: “Aristotle is not, in any of the works we 
have, attempting to give a historical account of earlier philosophy. He is using these theories as interlocu-
tors in the artificial debates which he sets up to lead ‘inevitably’ to his own solutions” (Cherniss 1935, 
xii cf. 349-50, 356-7; cf. Cherniss 1951; Ross 1958, vol. 1, 128; Mansion 1961, 75; McDiarmid 1970, 180; 
Stevenson 1974; Reale 1968 vol. 1, 151; Mansfeld 1986). Cherniss also holds that Metaph. A in particular 
is ‘dialectical’ in a way which excludes its being ‘historical’. But Cherniss is not always consistent about 
precisely what he means to deny, or explicit about what he takes the word ‘historical’ to imply. Guthrie 
1953 plausibly defends Aristotle as a historian of philosophy; but this is not the same as defending the 
claim that he is a historian of philosophy. Indeed, in adjudicating the Cherniss-Guthrie dispute, Ste-
venson 1974 takes it as common ground that “Nowhere was Aristotle trying to write a history of phi-
losophy” (139). In general, the methodological question of what Aristotle is trying to do in Metaphysics 
A 3ff. has been badly muddied by value-laden debates as to how far he is fair and reliable as a source: 
I will be concerned here with the former question only. For a recent and fair-minded discussion, see 
Collobert 2002.
4 See Mansfeld 1985b and Lloyd 1997 and 2002 for different kinds of doubts, with the comments 
of Laks 2005. It seems clear that Aristotle sees his story as one of a coherent enterprise, to which his own 
project of ‘first philosophy’ is heir (cf. Frede 2004).
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norms we now apply to the history of philosophy, sometimes merely to warn 
that his motives are ‘philosophical’ rather properly ‘historical’: but obviously 
such contrasts beg some important questions. For instance, when Ross says 
that “Aristotle’s object is not to write a history of philosophy but to confirm 
by reference to earlier philosophers his own account of the primary causes” 
(1958, 128), he is no doubt right, in way – but aren’t there also some questions 
being begged here about how many ‘objects’ a philosophical text can have, or 
perhaps about which ones are compatible? A more constructive starting-point 
is provided by Jaap Mansfeld’s observation that A 3ff. belongs to a distinctive 
Aristotelian genre: it is a dialectical survey of the endoxa, the reputable views 
which Aristotle likes to adopt as a starting-point for his own theorizing.5 As 
such, it belongs to the early history of doxography, which (in its dominant Peri-
patetic tradition) began as the assembling of competing philosophical doctrines 
for use in dialectic. But this cannot be the whole story about our text, for there 
are ways in which it is quite unlike Aristotle’s other dialectical surveys. For one 
thing, A 3ff. does much more than set out endoxa from which to begin: it is pre-
sented as an argument, supporting a distinctive and already posited Aristotelian 
position. Second, it in large part takes the form of a chronological narrative – a 
mode of presentation neither required nor typically exhibited by dialectic or 
doxography. 
This layering of genres – dialectical survey, corroborative argument, and his-
torical narrative – makes A 3ff. a very complex text. Much of my concern here 
will be to trace and disentangle these methodological strands. In doing so I will 
also be concerned to bring out the relation of A 3 to certain predecessor texts, 
including Plato’s Sophist and a doxographic work of the sophist Hippias. Early 
and foundational though it is, Aristotle’s text does not give us an unmediated 
response to the Presocratics. And some of its complexities can be traced back to 
its use of still earlier works, each with its own methods and agenda. 
1. The Introduction of the Project
“Since it is clear that we must obtain knowledge of the original causes (for we say 
we know each thing when we think we grasp its first cause), and the causes are said 
in four ways, of which we say one is the substance and the essence (for the primary 
‘why’ is referred ultimately to the account, and the primary ‘why’ is a cause and first 
principle),6 while one is matter and the underlying substrate, and a third is that from 
5 Cf. Mansfeld 1986
6 I here follow Primavesi in, with mss family α, reading prôton in 983a28 (omitted by β and Ross) 
as well as in 983a29.
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which there is a beginning of motion, and a fourth is the cause opposite to this, i.e., 
that-for-the-sake-of-which and the good7 (for this is the end of becoming and all 
motion) – well then, these having been studied sufficiently in our work on nature, 
nonetheless, let us take up also those who before us went to the study of being and 
philosophized about the truth. For it is clear that they too speak of certain first 
principles and causes.  So this will be of some help to those who take up the present 
subject. For either we will discover some other kind of cause, or we will trust all the 
more in those mentioned here.”8 (983a24-3b6)
The chapter opens with a brief and dogmatic reminder that we are seeking 
knowledge of ‘the original causes’ [tôn ex archês aitiôn]. The use of archê, his 
standard term for ‘first principle’, seems almost punning here; Aristotle will col-
locate causes and principles repeatedly in what follows (3a29, b3-4), and already 
in A 1-2 he has discussed wisdom as knowledge of ‘the first causes and first 
principles of all things’ (981b28-9, cf. 2a2, 2a5, 2b9).9 But the two categories are 
far from interchangeable. In fact, we need to distinguish them in order to prop-
erly articulate what Aristotle is arguing. His general project will be to examine 
the first causes proposed by various philosophers as claimants to the honorific 
status of archai – that is, as candidates for being the ultimately explanatory ‘first 
principles’ of reality, knowledge of which constitutes wisdom. In order to ex-
amine them, he will classify these causes in terms of his own schema: his claim 
about the very first philosophers, for instance, will be that each recognised a 
material cause (that is to say, a persisting substrate underlying the cosmic order, 
which they identified with various natural bodies) and claimed it to be the sole 
archê. At the same time Aristotle’s phrasing here delicately avoids asserting that 
his predecessors were engaged in exactly the same inquiry as himself. Instead 
he introduces two further terms for the objects of their inquiry, ‘truth’ [alêtheia] 
and ‘being’ (more precisely the plural, ‘beings’ or ‘things that are’ [ta onta]). These 
indicate, I take it, the subject matter of what Aristotle elsewhere terms ‘first phi-
losophy’. (‘Truth’, as Ross notes here, clearly means not just any old truth but 
“the ultimate nature of things”.10) It was in the course of thinking about truth 
7 I here follow Primavesi in reading a kai which α includes and β omits at 983a31, and adopt a sug-
gestion of Carlos Steel in taking it as epexegetical (‘i.e.’). 
8 Translations follow Primavesi’s text except where noted. Translations are my own, though heavily 
indebted to Ross; my aim is to be a bit more literal than Ross, reproducing some of the spontaneous-
looking convolutions of Aristotle’s prose. Translations from elsewhere in the Metaphysics are from Ross, 
sometimes with revisions, and from other works of Aristotle in the ROT translations except as noted.
9 On the concept of an archê, see Stephen Menn’s contribution to this volume, and Schofield 1997.
10  (1958) 128, with supporting references to Metaph. A, 988a20 and α 993a30, b17, b20. On alêtheia 
in these contexts cf. also Stephen Menn’s contribution to this volume.
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and being that earlier philosophers spoke of causes and first principles, which is 
what makes them relevant to the inquiry here. 
Aristotle’s very brief resume here of the four causes – formal, material, 
moving, and final –  assumes that they are familiar to his audience from his 
‘writings on nature’. This is plausibly our Physics, where the four causes are ex-
pounded in Book II, or some subset or predecessor text. There too the system 
of the causes is more explained than argued for, albeit at greater length, and 
so his use here of the term ‘studied’ [tetheôrêmenôn] is perhaps carefully chosen 
– with it, Aristotle avoids any claim to have proved the system of causes.11 True 
first principles can in any case be provided only with dialectical support, not 
demonstration. And though Physics I can be read as an exercise in the dialec-
tical establishment of first principles, these are the triad of form, privation and 
underlying subject -- not the four causes of Book II. So, as Mansion notes, the 
survey of Metaph. A 3-10 can be read as somewhat in lieu of the argument we 
might have expected for the four-cause system in the Physics itself (1961, 40) 
-- with the important change, of course, that the causes are here considered 
not as all-purpose modes of explanation, but as first causes – i.e., explanatorily 
fundamental causes of being as a whole, and putative first principles. 
In the course of A 3-10, Aristotle will periodically remind us of the work 
in hand in terms consistent with this introduction.12 At the start of A 7 he an-
nounces the completion of his survey and its result: none of his predecessors 
has mentioned any principle except those he himself has identified – but all 
evidently have some vague grasp of at least some of them (988a18-23). At the end 
of that chapter, as Aristotle segues to critical discussion, that result is restated; 
the earlier philosophers are now cited as witnesses – reluctant ones, presumably 
– testifying through their lack of any alternative to the correctness of Aristotle’s 
own system (988b16-18). After two chapters of critique, this result is reaffirmed 
once more, with the diagnosis of his predecessors as philosophically immature 
(993a11-17). So A 3-10 are occupied with a coherent and successfully com-
pleted project, yielding a clear result – or so, at any rate, Aristotle is determined 
to claim.13 
As already noted, that project bears a family resemblance to the surveys of 
Aristotle’s predecessors with which several other works begin, including De 
11 The term is most often used by Aristotle for observations of animals (e.g. GA 721a15, HA 501b21); 
at A2, 983a17, we might translate it as ‘discern’. Cf. Nightingale 2004 on the connotations of theôria. 
12 Cf. John Cooper’s contribution to this volume for an account of the trajectory of this argument, 
and that of A 1-10 as a whole.
13 Cf. 986a13-15, b2-12, 987a27-8, and the striking image at 987a2-3 of his predecessors as wise men 
summoned to a council (as at the opening of De Anima I.2).
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Anima I.2-5, Physics I and On Generation and Corruption I.1 (and in some ways 
Pol. II). But these predecessor-reviews are a very heterogeneous group, each 
of which presents its own interpretive puzzles. Moreover, there are at least 
two respects in which A 3ff. is something of an outlier.  First, the others are 
overtly and consistently diairetic, proceeding by a more or less systematic divi-
sion [diairesis] and classification of positions by content, in the manner which 
later becomes standard in the doxographic tradition.14 A crucial text here is 
Physics I.2, which divides thinkers according to whether they propounded one 
principle or more than one; if one, whether motionless or moving; if more 
than one, whether finite or infinitely many, and so on. On Generation and Cor-
ruption I.1 classes philosophers as to whether they identified generation with 
alteration or distinguished the two. In De Anima I.2, Aristotle classifies views 
according to the ‘mark’ taken as characteristic of soul: movement, thought, or 
both. Since accounts of soul often derive from views on first principles, De 
Anima also sketches an alternative diairesis in terms of the archai, dividing them 
into corporeal, incorporeal, or both, and again by whether they are one or many 
(404b30-5a4). But Metaph. A 3ff. will follow a diairetic structure only intermit-
tently, interwoven with chronological order. (The contrast with De Anima I.2 is 
particularly striking: there the atomists, Pythagoreans, Anaxagoras, Empedocles 
and Plato are all discussed before Thales.) Moreover, these other discussions are 
all explicitly concerned to establish a novel starting-point for theorizing. Only 
in A 3 do we begin with the initial positing of a previously articulated theory, 
which the survey is intended to corroborate.15
So the official form of the present survey is a distinctive one. It is roughly 
as follows, with P standing for the Aristotelian schema of causes: ‘P. One might 
propose instead Q, R, S, or T; but Q, R, S, and T can all be subsumed under P. 
Therefore P (and P alone).’16 Formally speaking, this is not any familiar mode 
14 See e.g., Theophrastus Phus. Dox. fr. 1-5 Diels, extracted from the exposition of Simplicius In Ph. 
IX.20.27ff. CAG. Simplicius is here of course following Aristotle’s own division in Physics I (presumably 
along with other intervening texts, including his Theophrastan source). Cf. also the division of positions 
in Theophrastus De Sensibus and the Menôneia portion of the Anon. Lond.
15 This is not to deny that the other predecessor-reviews are intended to eventually persuade us of a 
view which, however gradually it may be disclosed, represents an antecedent Aristotelian commitment. 
What is unique to Metaph. A is its explicitly and formally corroborative aim.
16 ‘Subsume’ does not correspond to any Aristotelian term, but seems right as a description of his 
overall strategy. What it means for one position to subsume another is a delicate question, but I take it 
that theory y subsumes a rival x by showing the following: (a) everything x gets right, y also gets right; 
(b) y puts these shared correct views more clearly and perspicuously than x; (c) there are some things x 
gets wrong, and y can explain why they are wrong (and not vice versa); and (d) there are some further 
things which y gets right and x does not (and not vice versa). This is, it seems to me, very much how 
we intuitively judge the superiority of one explanatory scheme over another. And it goes naturally with 
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of Aristotelian dialectical argument – and it is certainly not demonstrative ei-
ther. The closest analogue in the corpus is perhaps the argument of Metaphysics 
Γ. Here Aristotle explores the various avenues by which some thinkers have 
purported to deny the principle of non-contradiction (or have been alleged to 
do so), to show that none is genuinely viable. The upshot is that the principle 
(more precisely, the indisputability of the principle) is confirmed. The project 
embarked on in A 3 differs in that the operation here is presented as one of 
analysis and positive subsumption rather than refutation: still, it too seeks to 
dialectically confirm a claim about first principles by exploring the putative 
alternatives and showing that none really is an alternative. Thus both texts are 
exercises in what we might call the negative-corroborative use of dialectic. 
Criticisms of A 3ff. for the anachronistic application of Aristotle’s own con-
ceptual scheme are thus somewhat obtuse: the whole point of the exercise, 
about which Aristotle is perfectly explicit, is to see how far this can be made 
to work. At the same time, the exercise will only be of value insofar as the 
anachronism is combined with a certain historical scrupulosity. That is, it can 
only really show what Aristotle wants it to insofar as the predecessor theories 
considered (his chosen Q, R, S, and T) really do represent the most promising 
theoretical alternatives; and they must be presented in sufficiently accurate and 
transparent terms that anything valuable which could not be subsumed by his 
own system would remain visible as such. Given the terms of his own project, 
then, Aristotle should be scrupulous in presenting the views he discusses with 
sufficient clarity, accuracy and detail to convince an informed reader that his 
interpretive subsumptions are valid. Hence too his occasional presentation of 
his undertaking as a more sympathetic attempt to learn what can be learned 
from his predecessors, as wise men called to council (987a2-3, cf. 987a28). 
Two difficulties face us in trying to judge how far Aristotle’s subsumptions 
succeed. First, Aristotle’s translations of earlier theories into his own termi-
nology inevitably distort – and the more remote the theory from Aristotle’s 
own, conceptually and in time, the greater the distortion. For concepts such 
as ‘substance’ and ‘matter’ get their precise meaning from their roles in the 
Aristotelian system as a whole. To grasp the material cause just is to grasp how 
it relates to and differs from the other causes, and how exactly it contributes 
to substance and substantial change – and part of his point in A 3 will be that 
the earliest philosophers got all that wrong. So none of the terms here applied 
to their views can quite be meant sensu stricto. To grasp exactly what Aristotle 
a progressivist conception of philosophy (cf. (VI) below), on which it is the task of each new candidate 
theory both to capture what was valuable in its predecessors and to make progress beyond them. Cf. 
MacIntyre 1988 and 1990.
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means to attribute to his predecessors, we will need to disentangle the respects 
in which his terminology captures their insights from those in which it misrep-
resents, or even implicitly criticises. 
Second, we are unfortunately no longer in a position to be ‘informed 
readers’. In a few cases, most obviously Thales, Aristotle’s own evidence was 
clearly too scanty to make a really confident historical judgement possible, so 
that his expositions can only be intended as charitable rational reconstructions. 
Our own evidentiary position is of course dramatically worse: for most of the 
figures he discusses, we simply do not have enough independent and reliable 
information to judge Aristotle’s terminological translations and interpretive 
subsumptions against their originals. (It is of course tempting to try, however, 
and I will sometimes make a speculative attempt in what follows.) It is for this 
reason, I think, that A 3-10 sometimes strikes contemporary readers as inher-
ently self-serving or circular in its argument. On the analysis I have given of 
Aristotle’s procedure, there is nothing wrong with the form of argument here; 
the problem is rather an artifact of our circumstances. We need to imagine 
reading Metaphysics A at a time when Empedocles’ own text was easily available, 
and when any misrepresentations of Plato’s teaching might be contested by his 
successors. In that context Aristotle’s presentation must have read as parti pris 
and deliberately controversial, but without any clear sleight of hand or meth-
odological illegitimacy. And viewed at a somewhat higher level of generality, 
Aristotle’s method here rightly remains a standard one in historically informed 
philosophizing. How else could a philosophical stance dialectically corroborate 
its position, if not by showing that it can capture its predecessors’ insights, ex-
plain their limitations and correct their mistakes?17  
2. The Reasoning of the First Philosophers18
“Of those who first [prôton] philosophized, then, most thought that [a] the first prin-
ciples of all things were solely of the material type [en hulês eidei]. For [b] that from 
which all beings are and from which as a first thing they come to be, and into which 
they are in the end destroyed, remaining as an underlying substance but changing 
17 Cf. e.g., the works of Alasdair MacIntyre, including his 1984, 1988, and 1990, as well as Korsgaard 
1996 and Brandom 2002.
18 If with Primavesi we follow α in reading an adverbial prôton at 983b6 (rather than a genitive prôtôn 
with β), as I do in the translation given here, there is no point in A 3 at which Aristotle actually labels 
any group ‘the first philosophers’ (or more literally, ‘the first who have philosophized’). I will refer to the 
early materialists spoken of here using the phrase ‘first philosophers’ or ‘early/earliest philosophers’ for 
convenience; but it is worth remembering that Aristotle’s phrasing is less suggestive of a discrete group, 
and the scope of his allusion is vague.   
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in its affections, this they say is an element and first principle of all beings. And be-
cause of this they think that [c] nothing comes to be or is destroyed, as such a nature 
is always preserved, just as we say that [d] Socrates neither comes to be (without 
qualification) when he becomes beautiful or musical nor is destroyed when he loses 
these dispositions, because an underlying substrate remains, Socrates himself, and so 
too neither does any of the other things <come to be or be destroyed>. [e] For it is 
necessary that there be some nature, either one or more than one, from which the 
other things arise while it is preserved.”19 (983b6-20)
Aristotle’s introduction leaves open the membership of the group vaguely iden-
tified as ‘most of those who first philosophized’. Presumably the group strictly 
speaking includes only the pre-Parmenidean philosophers Aristotle will list at 
984a2-8 prior to Empedocles and Anaxagoras, since the latter two, like Parme-
nides, do to some extent recognise another cause.20 At the same time, these two 
are evidently close enough to their monistic predecessors in their conception 
and use of the material cause to be reasonably grouped with them – this is par-
ticularly clear in the case of Empedocles, whose four ‘elements’ repeat three of 
the archai already proffered. 
Aristotle here credits these earliest philosophers with [a] a kind of material 
cause as archê; glosses this in terms of [b] a persistent underlying substrate; [c] at-
tributes to them a denial of generation and destruction; [d] explains this denial 
by analogizing the archê to a primary substance undergoing qualitative change, 
such as Socrates (already adumbrated by the reference to the substrate as ousia 
at 983b9-10); and [e] suggests a motivation for all these positions in the idea that 
there must be a persisting ‘nature’ from which other things arise. As I noted 
earlier, and Aristotle himself is well aware, concepts like ‘material cause’ only 
find their proper sense as part of his own system as a whole: so a certain amount 
of distortion is necessarily built in to the present account, and even a certain 
incoherence – for instance, the relation of material substrate to substance [b] 
is not really the same as that of a substance to its changing attributes [d]. Thus 
even without allowing for outright misreadings or failures of understanding on 
Aristotle’s part, we may arrive at very different readings of the early materialists 
depending on what we think needs to be subtracted or rephrased. 
With that caveat, the focal claim here is stated clearly in [a]: the earliest phi-
losophers recognized a material cause. Ross qualifies even this, saying “Aristotle 
does not say that the earlier thinkers recognized the material cause” (1958, 128); 
19 Letters in translated passages are of course mine for ease of reference.
20 A complication is that in that case all the true materialists (and hence all the members of the ‘first’ 
group) are monists. But later, at 987a3-9, Aristotle seems to say that this group includes never-named 
pluralists (or dualists) as well.
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for the ultimate material cause is prime matter, and their analysis went only as 
far as the four elements. This seems somewhat beside the point, however. Even 
assuming that Aristotle believes in ‘prime matter’, what fixes the meaning of the 
term hulê is the functional role of matter as the substrate of substances. And this 
role is just what Aristotle emphasises here by using the phrase, ‘of the material 
type’, or more literally ‘in the role of <or of the kind or type of> matter [en 
hulês eidei, 983b7]’. This means something like ‘properly classed as material’; and 
a cause is properly classed as material if it persists as a substrate through substan-
tial change.21 For Aristotle, a cause which does the work of the material cause is 
a material cause, however poorly identified or incompletely understood. 
If this is right, then what warrants classifying an earlier thinker’s choice of 
cause as material has nothing to do with whether it resembles the material 
ingredients of Aristotle’s own cosmos.22 One might object that in that case 
Anaximander’s apeiron should be just as much a material cause as water; and yet 
Anaximander will be mysteriously absent from Aristotle’s account here. This is 
only a small corner of the large interpretive puzzle raised by Aristotle’s treat-
ment of Anaximander. Aristotle’s explicit references to Anaximander are too 
few and sketchy to provide a clear sense of how he understands the apeiron 
(cf. Physics 187a21, 203b14; GC. 332a19-25),23 and it is controversial whether we 
should see Anaximander in Aristotle’s otherwise mysterious references to those 
who postulated an ‘intermediate’ substrate.24 I cannot address these larger prob-
lems here: the issue is worth raising just in order to note that it can explain 
Aristotle’s otherwise puzzling ‘most’ in 983b7, rather than ‘all’. Aristotle may be 
quietly allowing that one major figure does not fit into his story here and will 
be elided. If this is right, it implies that Aristotle takes Anaximander’s apeiron 
not to persist as substrate; presumably the opposites, once ‘separated off ’, are 
precisely not indeterminate or indefinite [apeira] any more.25 
What the philosophers to be discussed have in common, then, is their com-
mitment to a single persisting material substrate (whatever its nature), from 
21 That this is what Aristotle means by the phrase is clear from Metaph. A 5, 986b4-7. 
22 Thus at A 5, 987a7, the fact that the first philosophers regarded the archê as bodily [somatikê] is 
presented as a distinct point from their having set down those archai as material.
23 Admittedly Simplicius takes it for granted that the apeiron is a stoicheion in the manner of the other 
monistic archai, In Ph. IX.24.13. But Graham seems to me too quick to attribute this reading to Aristotle 
himself (2006, Ch. 2, 3.2, and 20 n. 55).
24 Physics A 4, 187a12ff. seems to me to be decisive evidence against that identification. 
25 Granted, this suggestion is not only speculative but presupposes that Aristotle conceived of 
Anaximander’s apeiron as essentially indeterminate. And the original sense of apeiron in Anaximander is 
more likely to have been untraversable or boundless  -- that is, spatially infinite rather than qualitatively 
indeterminate, though no doubt the apeiron was the latter as well. See Graham 2006, 29-31 and Kahn 
1960, 231ff.
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which particular entities arise and into which they are destroyed: I shall use 
the phrase material monism, standardly applied to these thinkers, for precisely 
this claim.26 Now whether this is a reasonable reading of the philosophers Ar-
istotle lists is a controversial question, and exactly what he means to attribute 
to them is not as obvious as is sometimes assumed. Aristotle is usually read as 
here holding that Thales’ water, for instance, is the persisting substrate of each 
individual object or Aristotelian primary substance – and also that it is the ousia, 
the nature or essence, of each one, overlaid with merely superficial qualitative 
variations. This amounts to reading the earliest philosophers as working with 
the same basic ontological schema as post-Parmenideans like Empedocles and 
Anaxagoras. For Empedocles, trees and tables are really just compounds of the 
four elements, which do not change; what Aristotle sees as substantial genera-
tion is just rearrangement of these elements into different complexes.27 It is the 
four elements which are ‘substance’, in the sense that they are what all things re-
ally are; and they are neither generated nor destroyed. Likewise, mutatis mutandis, 
for the basic entities affirmed by Anaxagoras and the atomists.28 Aristotle in [c]-
[d] seems to claim that this pattern – material reductionism, we might call it – is a 
constant from the days of the earliest philosophers. This view needs to be kept 
sharply distinct from the weaker thesis of material monism proper, which as 
articulated above and in [a] by no means entails a reductionist stance. Aristotle 
seems here to attribute both positions to the earliest philosophers: about each, 
we can ask both whether this is the right reading of Aristotle and whether it is 
the right reading of the thinkers in question.
One reason we might have doubts about reductionist monism is that in [e] 
Aristotle seems to gesture towards the motivation for the view he has been dis-
cussing (introduced with ‘for’ [gar] at 983b17): “For it is necessary [dei] that there 
be some nature, either one or more than one, from which the other things arise 
while it is preserved.”29 I take the emphasis here to be twofold, on the need for 
26 I cannot here enter into the long and complex history of scholarship on material monism: for a 
recent rethinking which includes a helpful history and recapitulation of the standard view, see Graham 
2006. Graham argues that material monism as construed by the standard view was really the innovation 
of Diogenes of Apollonia, and offers a plausible alternative reading of the earlier theories as versions of 
a ‘generating substance theory’. Considerations of space make it impossible for me to engage properly 
with his arguments here, but note that we differ importantly regarding the interpretive options for A 
3: Graham’s ‘material monism’ includes what I distinguish as material reductionism (2006, Ch. 3.2) and, 
unlike me, he takes A 3 to be unambiguous in attributing both to the early monists. 
27 DK31B8, B9, A28, etc.
28 For Anaxagoras, DK59B10, A43; for the atomists, see DK68A37, B9.
29 I here assume that we should take 983b17-18, quoted above, following Primavesi’s text, with the 
dei found in all mss. This is controversial: Bywater and Ross here emend to aei (or, Ross suggests, Wirth’s 
dein), “since the clause is still concerned with what the early philosophers thought” (1958, 129). But 
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a ‘from which’ and for it to be ‘preserved’. These are needed to avoid genera-
tion ex nihilo, the urgency of which is made clear by some strong wording in 
On Generation and Corruption: “that coming-to-be proceeds out of nothing pre-
existing <is>... a thesis which, more than any other, preoccupied and alarmed 
the earliest philosophers” (I.3, 317b28-31, trans. Joachim). Now this desideratum 
in no way requires material reductionism: any pre-existing and persisting archê 
will do the trick.30 Moreover, in contrasting the Eleatics with their predecessors 
a bit later on in A 3, Aristotle says: “the one and nature as a whole is unchange-
able not only in respect of generation and destruction (for this is an ancient 
belief, and all agreed in it)...” (984a 32-3). 31 This is, I think, significant: what is 
important to the ancients is not that there be no generation and destruction of 
ordinary substances, but that there be none of nature as a whole, i.e. the cosmos 
itself. Thus [e] in our text stresses that there must be at least one eternally ex-
isting thing from which the cosmos has come to be.
Moreover, the reading of the earliest philosophers as material reduction-
ists may reasonably inspire doubts on external grounds. Even allowing for the 
general paucity of our sources, there is remarkably little evidence to support it – 
even within the doxographic tradition which was so enormously influenced by 
Aristotle and Metaphysics A in particular.32 And post-Parmenidean reductionism 
would clearly be a more difficult thesis for a monist to hold (or even make 
intelligible) than for a pluralist like Empedocles, since no rearrangement of 
diverse elements can be used to explain diversity and change. The very idea of 
an archê as ‘element’ [stoicheion], i.e. an inhering partial material constituent (like 
it would hardly be extraordinary for Aristotle to drop into direct discourse (and thus, in a loose way, 
propria persona) to voice the reasoning of the early philosophers. Compare for instance 983b30-4, just a 
few lines later, where the whole reasoning of those who attribute doxai to the theologians is given in 
direct discourse.
30 If this is the basic motivation for the archê, we might wonder why it must be supposed to persist 
eternally once the cosmos has been generated. Perhaps otherwise the ‘generation’ to which it gives rise 
might just be seen as an arbitrary Hesiod-style succession of new entities: if the pre-existent A is no 
part of any generated B, the generation of B is covertly ex nihilo after all. Or perhaps, on the ‘reservoir 
monism’ view, the persistence of the archê is necessary to guarantee an ongoing, recyclable supply of 
beings of all kinds. 
31 Contra Jaeger and Ross, Primavesi double-brackets this interjection on ‘the ancient view’ and 
the later comment, “And this is peculiar to them” (see section V for the full translation of the passage), 
both of which are omitted from the β tradition and Alexander’s paraphrase, as later supplements to the 
α-tradition (see his discussion, as Text 13). But his reasons seem to me inconclusive, and there is nothing 
un-Aristotelian about the thought or language. As Jaeger notes ad loc., the basic point is the same as that 
already made at 983b6-11. A very useful clarification is added en passant, however, namely that it is in 
relation to ‘the one and the whole nature’, i.e. the cosmos as a whole, that the ancients denied generation 
and destruction. So the passage is not entirely redundant.
32 What evidence there is includes Anaximenes DK13A5, Xenophanes DK21B29 and B33 (but 
Xenophanes goes unmentioned in A 3), and Heraclitus, DK22B30. 
History and Dialectic 165 
a letter in a word), seems out of place in a monistic system, despite Aristotle’s 
use of the term at 983b10-11. 
So we have reason to be skeptical about material reductionism as a reading 
of the earliest monists. Moreover, neither here nor elsewhere does Aristotle at-
tribute the crucial reductionist stance to them – that is, the view that all things 
are ‘really only’ water (for instance). To say that some archê is ousia is to grant it 
honorific ontological standing, but not necessarily to the point of reductionism 
about anything else, any more than Aristotle himself is a reductionist about 
non-substantial attributes. 
Some scholars have gone to the other extreme in holding that the attribu-
tion of even material monism – that is, any sort of persistent archê – is an Aristo-
telian misrepresentation, particularly in the case of Thales. It has been suggested 
that his archê of water was simply a first thing -- a starting-point for cosmogony, 
with no role as enduring substrate.33 This seems to me an overreaction, and 
there is certainly no strong evidence against the ascription of material monism 
to him.34 So I would suggest that we should be skeptical of both interpretive ex-
tremes, material reductionism on the one hand and the denial of even material 
monism on the other. In between, there are two intermediate positions worth 
distinguishing. On one, water persists as part of each transient object: this tree 
and that chair each include it as an ‘element’ and persisting substrate (without 
however being reducible to it). This is how material monism has standardly 
been understood – call it classic monism -- and brings the monists closest to Ar-
istotle’s own conception of matter. But we might also distinguish a somewhat 
less Aristotelian- and less post-Parmenidean-sounding possibility. On this view, 
which we might call reservoir monism, water persists as a substrate not within 
each individual being but only in relation to the cosmos as a whole. It acts as 
a kind of reservoir of being from which generation takes place, and to which 
the matter of destroyed entities is returned for recycling. This view holds that 
all things are generated from and destroyed into water; and that water, which is 
33 E.g., Waterfield 2000, xiii. 
34 It is perhaps also worth noting that a reading of the earliest philosophers as material monists is not 
really optional for Aristotle. If their archê is not an enduring substrate, then it fails to be a material cause; 
and it is certainly not a cause of any other kind. Only by reading the first philosophers as material mon-
ists can Aristotle find a place for them among his ancestors. Moreover, as we shall see below, Aristotle 
inherits a Platonic reading on which the ancient cosmogonies are understood as analyses of ‘being’ and 
‘truth’ – that is, of what there really is – as Aristotle acknowledges when he introduces them at 983b2-3. 
On that ‘ontological’ reading the persistence of the archê and its status as ousia is a given. So Aristotle’s 
reading here can be seen as overdetermined by a number of different interpretive considerations.  
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alone eternal, is therefore the persisting archê and sole ousia of the cosmos; and 
yet allows that water is genuinely transformed into other bodies.35 
We have two tiny hints that the earliest philosophers might indeed have 
seen their archê in these terms. As Heraclitus says: all things in exchange for 
fire, and fire in exchange for all things (DK22B90). This talk of exchange im-
plies real distinctness, just as money is distinct from the goods we buy and sell 
with it; but also a special, foundational status for fire as the inexhaustible and 
universal medium of change, always available in sufficient stock to compensate 
for fluctuations in other commodities. Second, we are told that according to 
Thales the earth rests on water (DK 11 A14, A15; A 3 983b21-2). This claim has 
standardly been seen as a traditional piece of Near Eastern cosmology, and even, 
skeptically, as the seed from which a distorting depiction of Thales as material 
monist arose.36 Again, I see no reason to go this far, but it is worth noting two 
things about this doctrine. First and most obviously, it seems to presuppose a 
real distinction between water and earth as cosmic bodies. And second, by de-
picting water as literally basic – as fundamental or ‘underlying’ in an ongoing 
way – it might reasonably suggest to Aristotle that water is ontologically basic 
to Thales’ cosmos as well. This doctrine does nothing to imply that water is a 
component as material substrate of each individual object: rather it is in a quite 
literal way the basis for our cosmos as a whole, the body from and on which 
other things grow.
Can we see any room left for reservoir monism in Aristotle’s own text? As I 
noted earlier, Aristotle does not go so far as to cast the motivations or conclu-
sions of the first philosophers in reductionist terms. And if this leaves a space 
for a non-reductionist version of monism, then the choice between classic and 
reservoir monism seems to me an open question. For it turns on just how we 
should understand the role of archê as persisting substrate, whether in relation 
to each particular generated object or to the cosmos as a whole. And Aristotle’s 
very general references here to ‘(all) beings’ (983b8, b11, cf. ta alla b18) seem to 
leave this open. 
So it seems to me that Aristotle’s presentation of the monists is in fact un-
derdetermined: it is compatible with all of reservoir monism, classic monism, 
35 What I call reservoir monism has some affinities with Graham’s ‘generating substance theory’ 
(2006, Chapters 3-4), which he proposes as a non-monistic reading of the early Ionians. I intend  reser-
voir monism as a kind of material monism, though, on the supposition that (a) it emphasises the eternal 
nature of the archê, understood as a persisting, ontologically prior component of the cosmos as a whole, 
and (b) that a view can legitimately count as monistic without insisting on the strict numerical identity 
of all beings, if it emphasises that a single (kind of) being has a fundamental, explanatory and honorific 
status.   
36 E.g., Waterfield 2000, xiii. See Algra 1999, 49-54 for a succinct statement of the reasons for doubt.
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and material reductionism. We might view this as the effect of a half-hearted at-
tempt at standardization on Aristotle’s part, a retrojection of post-Parmenidean 
ideas on to the early monists. But in fact the sources of this underdetermination 
are, I think, much more complicated. 
This can best be seen if we consider the alleged denial of ‘generation and 
destruction’ in [c] above. This is clearly not meant au pied de la lettre: Aristotle is 
happy, throughout A 3-10, to speak of generation and destruction in describing 
the views of the first philosophers; his criticisms in A8 even describe them as 
seeking to explain these phenomena (988b26-7). A complete denial of all be-
coming would annul the distinction between the monists and the Eleatics; and 
at 986b14-15 Aristotle presumably has the former in mind in contrasting the 
Eleatics with phusiologoi who set down being as one but nonetheless ‘generate’ 
from it as from matter. What Aristotle means to claim is rather that the monists 
deny substantial generation – and what he means by that is that their account 
does not hold it distinct from qualitative change. Taken together with their use 
of the archê in the role of substance, this amounts to the same charge Aristotle 
levels against them in On Generation and Corruption I.1: they reduce the genera-
tion and destruction of substances to qualitative change in the archê as substrate. 
But the evidence of GC. I.1 cuts both ways. For Aristotle there states initially 
that some earlier philosophers say that generation and alteration are the same 
(314a6-8); but when he actually turns to expound the views of the monists, the 
point is twice put in terms of what it is necessary [anankê, anankaion] for them 
to say (314a9-10, b1-5). That is, their conflation of generation and qualitative 
change is an inference on Aristotle’s part, a position to which he takes them to 
be committed given their other views – not an explicit or intended doxa.37 
So too in A 3 too, it seems to me that Aristotle’s claim is not that the earliest 
philosophers shared the post-Parmenidean reductionist agenda, but rather that 
they lacked the conceptual resources that would be needed to clearly distin-
guish their views from reductionist ones. His presentation presses them, so to 
speak, in the direction of material reductionism; but this is as much a matter 
of critique as interpretation. They intended to deny generation and destruction 
only of the cosmos as a whole; but the mechanisms they used to do so leave 
them with no obvious way to resist an unfortunate assimilation of all generation 
to mere qualitative change.  
This interpretive ‘pressure’ has, I think, a rather complicated origin. In Meta-
physics Z, Aristotle presents what looks like the A 3 account of the archai once 
more, but here under the rubric of to on: 
37 Cf. Barnes 1982, 41.
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“And indeed the question which was long ago and is now and always the object of 
inquiry, and is always puzzled over, viz. what is being, is just the question, what is 
substance? For it is this that some assert to be one, others more than one, and that 
some assert to be limited in number, others unlimited. And so we also must consider 
chiefly and primarily and almost exclusively what that is which is in this sense.” (Ζ1, 
1028b2-7)
Aristotle here presents – as an ancient topic of discussion – a division [diairesis] 
of positions which corresponds reasonably well with the progression of archai 
given in Metaph. A 3, from ‘one’ (monists such as Thales) to ‘many’ (the plural-
ists), some of whom opt for ‘limited’ (Empedocles) and others for ‘unlimited’ 
(Anaxagoras). But here these are presented as accounts of what being [to on] is, 
used in turn as a proxy for substance [ousia]. (‘Being’ is here again to be under-
stood in a strong sense, as at A 3, 983b2: the question is what there really is, in 
a fundamental, explanatory and honorific sense.) And, crucially, this reading is 
taken by Aristotle as closer to what the early thinkers themselves had in mind; for 
at the outset of A 3, as we noted, he says that he will be mining the ‘investigation 
of beings’ which his predecessors carried out, for their views about causes and 
first principles (983b1-3).
In other words Aristotle casts his project in A 3 as involving a re-interpre-
tation of earlier theories of being, by which the honorific onta of each thinker 
will be recast as their archai – as an interpretive innovation, that is, over the 
reading sketched in Z 1. Now if we ask where that prior reading itself came 
from, the answer is not far to seek. For the Z 1 account is clearly shaped by 
Plato’s proto-doxography of accounts of being in the Sophist. Here the Eleatic 
Visitor squarely presents the early philosophical debate as one about being, ta 
onta. It is about ta onta that, as he puts it, his predecessors asked posa kai poia: 
‘how many beings there are and of what sort’ (Sophist 242c5-6). That this text 
(and/or related ones, perhaps, which have not survived)38 is on Aristotle’s mind 
in Metaph. A is confirmed by his use of the crucial catchphrase ‘how many and 
what sort’. This phrase is used by Aristotle for the account he takes himself to 
have vindicated in A 7 (988b17), and it is clearly alluded to in his introduction 
in A 3, when he says that the first philosophers disagreed as to the amount [plê-
thos] and kind [eidos] of the archai (983b19).39 This is just after his admission in 
38 On our very scattered evidence for pre-Aristotelian proto-doxography, see the work of Jaap 
Mansfeld, especially Mansfeld 1986.
39 This double mode of inquiry – into the question, ‘how many and what sort’ -- can also of course 
be applied to specific kinds of beings: e.g., in the Philebus, both sounds (17b7-8) and pleasures (19b3). 
(For the doxographic import of this passage, see the forthcoming work of Phillip Horky.) For the for-
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A 3 that his predecessors were engaged in an investigation of being, the reading 
spelled out in Z 1. 
Now this prior, Platonic reading does seem to involve presenting the ancient 
monists as committed to a kind of reductionism: for it reads their accounts of 
their archai as accounts of what things really are. The upshot is confusing and even 
seems backwards from our point of view: for to us it seems natural to interpret 
Thales’ water as the source of other beings, and much more tendentious to take 
it as what all things really are. But from Aristotle’s point of view, apparently, it 
was the other way around. This interpretive inheritance helps to explain why 
Aristotle’s reading in A 3 ‘presses’ the ancients in the direction of reductionism. 
But, complicating matters still further, there is a countervailing pressure here 
as well, for Aristotle is now using these theories as accounts not of ta onta but 
of the archai.  And – barring some fairly elaborate loop of argument – a cause 
or first principle is not to be identified with the being of which it is a cause 
or first principle. The result in A 3 is a sort of interpretive impasse, leaving it 
underdetermined whether we should read the earliest philosophers as material 
reductionists, or merely classic or ‘reservoir’ monists. It is ironic that in leaving 
the door open to the latter readings Aristotle’s account becomes much more 
plausible by our interpretive lights. For it evidently results not as a direct re-
sponse to the evidence, but as a further twist to a very programmatic inherited 
reading, here reshaped to fit the local demands of Aristotle’s own project. The 
following sections will bring out some further respects in which A 3 is highly 
responsive to earlier interpretive traditions. 
3. Thales, the Theologians and Hippo
Aristotle now turns to a rational reconstruction of the thought of Thales, leader 
or founder [archêgos, another pun on archê] of the early philosophers, which 
leads him to consider whether his starting-point should be earlier still: 
“However they do not all say the same about the number and kind of such a prin-
ciple, but Thales, the founder of this sort of philosophy, says [a] it is water (hence he 
also declared that [b] the earth rests on water), perhaps getting this opinion from 
seeing that [c] the nurture of all things is moist, and that [d] the hot itself arises from 
this and [e] the animal lives by this (and [f] that from which they come to be is a prin-
ciple of all things) – he got this opinion because of this, and [g] because the seeds of 
all things have a moist nature, and [h] water is the origin of the nature of moist things.
mula in Aristotle cf. De Caelo 277b25; EN. 1115a5, 1135a14; GC. 329b3; HA. 505b23; Mete. 338a23; PA. 660a7; 
Ph. 194b17; Pol. 1299a31; Rh. 1368b32, 1369b29. 
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There are some who think that the very ancient <thinkers>, who lived long be-
fore the present generation and first discussed divine matters, also held this opinion 
about nature. For they made Ocean and Tethys the parents of generation, and the 
oath of the gods water, called by them Styx. For what is oldest is most honoured, and 
what is most honoured is what one swears by. Well then, whether this opinion about 
nature is actually primitive and ancient may perhaps be unclear, but at any rate Thales 
is said to have declared himself in this fashion about the first cause. For Hippo no one 
would think worthy to include with these <thinkers>, because of the shoddiness of 
his thought.” (983b20-4a5)
The treatment of Thales is much fuller than that given to the other first phi-
losophers. His selection of the archê [a] is followed by [b] as a corollary. This 
is perhaps to give a taste of the sort of use which the first philosophers made 
of their archai, though it has been argued that Thales’ reasoning is more likely 
to have been the other way around.40 Aristotle then turns to assign empirical 
reasons [‘he saw’, horôn, b23] in [c]-[g] for Thales’ selection of the moist, i.e., as 
[h] clarifies, of water. Nothing comparable is offered for the later philosophers 
listed; perhaps the grounds offered here are to suggest the kind of reasons relied 
on by the others, mutatis mutandis. 
The reasoning attributed to Thales is avowedly speculative.41 The first reason 
mentioned, [c], is qualified with a ‘perhaps’ [isôs], and though this is not repeated 
with the others there is no obvious reason to give them greater credence. When 
Aristotle returns to Thales at 984a2, ‘he is said’ [legetai] is applied even to his 
opinion about the archê. This combination of extensive and charitable rational 
reconstruction with scrupulous modesty about the evidence is striking. Evi-
dently Aristotle is determined to claim Thales as the first of his philosophical 
ancestors: this requires him to attribute to Thales both a version of ‘material 
monism’ and some rational basis for his views, but Aristotle refuses to pretend 
that either is well-attested.   
The reasons ascribed to Thales unfold in a stuttering, spontaneous-looking 
way, and it is hard to tell how many are intended as fully independent or dis-
tinct. At any rate [d]-[f] seem to constitute a unit, arguing for the primacy of 
moisture on the basis of its priority to heat. Exactly how this argument works 
depends on a delicate textual question. In the translation above, with Primavesi, 
I follow mss α in reading kai to zôion toutôi zôn, so that the ‘this’ [toutôi] by which 
40 E.g. Cherniss 1935, 4 and 1951, 321-2. The doxa is repeated at De Caelo 294a29-30. 
41 As Ross notes, Aristotle always speaks of Thales’ views with caution: cf. De Caelo 294a29; De Anima 
405a19, 411a8; Pol. 1259a6, 18. Cf. Snell 1942, 171-2. Cherniss suggests that Hippo is not only the source of 
the reasoning Aristotle here attributes to Thales, but of that attribution: Hippo “may have sought in this 
way to lend it [sc. his doctrine of the archê] authority after the fashion of antiquity” (1951, 321).
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an animal is said to live is presumably heat.42 This reading gives a reasonably 
straightforward argument: water is what heat comes from [d];43 animals live by 
heat [e]; that from which something comes is its archê [f]; implicit conclusion, 
water is the archê of heat and, by a kind of transitivity, of the animal life which 
depends on it.44 This would serve as a neat counterargument against the rival 
candidacy of fire as archê, in which case it would be unlikely to predate Hip-
pasus and Heraclitus; but presumably Thales could have offered it simply as an 
argument from observation. Moisture and heat are both signs of life;  if mois-
ture is prior to heat, it is plausibly prior to all life. 
Now on this reading, it is left open in [d]-[f] how or in what sense heat and 
animal life are ‘from’ moisture; but plausibly the moisture in question is that of 
seeds or nurture, noted in [c] and [g] respectively – so there is a certain redun-
dancy here, with [d]-[f] explaining [c] and prompting [g] in turn. The advantage 
of this reading is that it can explain why [g] is introduced with the resumptive 
‘-- because of this, and...’[dia te dê touto...kai dia]. This phrasing frames the pre-
ceding as amounting to a single piece of reasoning, one sufficiently complex or 
digressive that forward movement now needs to be explicitly resumed.45  
It has long been noted that at least some of the reasoning here attributed 
to Thales has been drawn by Aristotle from the later hydromonist Hippo – [g] 
42 The mss family β has instead kai toutô zôn, ‘and it lives by this’, so that heat, continuing as subject, 
is said to live by moisture, and animals are not invoked. This may actually seem preferable as far as sense 
goes. For it suggests that we read ‘and it lives by this’ as epexegetical of the preceding phrase, giving an 
explanation of how the hot is ‘from’ the moist. (And it does seem to have been a common Presocratic 
doctrine that fire is ‘nourished’ by moisture, so that the fire of the heavenly bodies must depend on 
exhalations from the sea (Meteorology II.2, 354b33-5a32) (see also following note).) This reading also gives 
a cleaner argument to [d]-[f] as a whole, as a simple syllogism that the moist is archê of the hot. My 
reasons for nonetheless preferring α (even apart from considerations of textual tradition and authority) 
are given above.
43 This may sound odd to us, but the hot and the moist were standardly linked in both cosmo-
logical-meteorological and biological-medical contexts. For the medical version, see On Regimen I and 
Lloyd 1964. The view that the sun was somehow nourished by moist exhalations seems to have been 
widespread, and not restricted to Heracliteans (though this is controversial: cf. Cherniss 1935, 133-6, Kirk 
1954, 264ff, and Graham 2006, 58-62). In the Meteorology Aristotle reports the reasoning behind this view 
as involving an inference from observable fires: “the fire we are familiar with lives as long as it is fed, and 
the only food for fire is moisture” (355a3-5).
44 The latter does not quite follow, since the ‘by’ relation which links heat to animal life, represented 
by the dative at b24, is perhaps not quite the same thing as one thing ‘coming from’ [ek] the other: but 
the general relation of priority here is plausibly a transitive one.
45 Cf. Ross ad loc., who speaks of Aristotle as offering “two reasons” to Thales in toto, from nutriment 
and from seed (1959, 129, cf. 125).
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certainly, and perhaps the rest as well.46 In De Anima, Aristotle explicitly ascribes 
[g] to Hippo, as a basis for holding that the soul is water: 
“Of more superficial writers, some have also declared it <the soul> to be water, such 
as Hippo. They seem to have been persuaded by the fact that the seed of all things is 
moist. For he even refutes those who say that the soul is blood, <arguing> that the 
seed is not blood. For this is the first soul.”47 
Moreover, we have good evidence that [b]-[f] should be attributed to Hippo as 
well. According to Hippolytus, Hippo claimed that water and fire are both ar-
chai, but that water begets fire, which in turn overmasters it to form the cosmos 
(Ref. I.16). In other words, that the hot is ‘from’ the wet ([d]) is the most basic 
principle of Hippo’s cosmogony. Moreover, Aristotle’s [b], the not-obviously-
pertinent doctrine that the earth rests on the sea, is close to explicit in our one 
surviving ‘fragment’ of Hippo’s work. Preserved in a Homeric scholion, this is 
a lumbering syllogism arguing that since it goes deeper than wells, springs etc., 
the sea must be the source of fresh water:
“All drinking waters come from the sea. For the wells from which we drink are surely 
not deeper than the sea is. If they were, the water would come not from the sea but 
from somewhere else. But in fact the sea is deeper than the waters. Now all waters 
that are higher than the sea come from the sea.”48
This reads like an argument for [b], and a plausible one at that: how could the 
sea could be the source of wells and springs, unless they percolate up from seas 
beneath the earth? 
If we take these points together, it seems that the great bulk of Aristotle’s 
report on Thales may in fact have derived from Hippo. (That is: it derives from a 
source which drew on Hippo’s doctrines, whether or not this source also attrib-
uted them to Thales.) Now this should be put together with the fact that the 
report is immediately followed by Aristotle’s digression (or retrogression) into 
the poets. As Bruno Snell argued in an important paper, this passage, together 
with certain proto-doxographic passages of Plato’s Theaetetus and Cratylus, is 
almost certainly  derived from a landmark of ancient doxography, the sophist 
Hippias’ anthology of ‘related ideas’.49 Before getting into why this is signifi-
46 Cf. Ross ad loc (1958, 129), with references to Burnet, Zeller and Döring. Simplicius In Ph. 
IX.23.21-9 attributes [c] to Thales and Hippo alike. 
47 405b1-5, my translation. The moistness of seed is also noted in the brief account of Hippo at 
Hippolytus Ref. I.16.
48 Schol. Homer. Genev.197, 19 Nicole, on Iliad XXI.195 = DK38B1, trans. Barnes 1987.
49 DK86B6; cf. Snell 1944, Mansfeld 1983, 1986, Frede 2004. A thorough and helpful study of Hip-
pias’ work, which anticipates much of my argument in this section, is Patzer 1986. The title of the work 
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cant, we need to see what exactly Aristotle does in this excursus. It moots the 
question of whether the ancient ‘theologians’ (clearly including Homer and 
Hesiod, and doubtless Orpheus and Musaeus to boot) shared Thales’ doxa about 
the archê and expressed it in their depictions of Ocean, Styx, and so forth. After 
explaining why ‘some people’ think they did, Aristotle dismisses the claim with 
no real explanation, saying only that it ‘may perhaps be unclear’ whether this 
doctrine is indeed so ancient (984a2).50 Since the argument given in favour of 
the particular allegorical interpretation at stake is valid,51 Aristotle’s scepticism 
appears to be about the very idea of allegorically mining such texts for phusikai 
doxai. 
This is often taken as a blanket dismissal by Aristotle of the poets from philo-
sophical discussion. But in fact his stance is subtler and more complex, as some 
parallel texts later in the Metaphysics help to bring out. The issue arises again at 
the start of A 4, when Aristotle notes, perhaps prompted by Hippias once more, 
that Hesiod might be credited with discovery of the final cause; and here too 
the question is basically punted (984b31-2). 52 In B 4, Aristotle for a third time 
invokes the poets only to dismiss them. He complains, “the school of Hesiod 
and all the mythologists thought only of what was plausible to themselves, and 
had no regard to us” (1000a9-11), in treating ambrosia and nectar as somehow, 
mysteriously, causes of immortality. He brushes them aside as not worth serious 
investigation; “those, however, who use the language of proof we must cross-
examine and ask why, after all, things which consist of the same elements are, 
some of them, eternal in nature, while others perish” (1000a18-22). Here we 
seem to have what was never explicit in A 3-4: a programmatic statement of 
demarcation between poetry and philosophy. Still, even here matters are not so 
simple. It is striking that the phrasing of Aristotle’s initial complaint, that the 
described in B6 is unknown; the title Sunagôgê (‘Collection’) would be appropriate, and is attested for 
Hippias, but the content attributed to it in DK86B4 is difficult to square with the description in B6.
50 See Mansfeld 1985a, 132-4 and Palmer 2000, 184-5. Note that this does not mean or entail that the 
poets were themselves unclear: Aristotle’s remarks about the unclear state of our knowledge about cer-
tain views (cf. 984b18) should not be conflated with his complaints that various authors have expressed 
themselves unclearly. The latter criticism is used principally against philosophers, notably Xenophanes and 
Empedocles (986b21-5, 993a22-4, cf. 985a4-6 etc.), rather than poets (contra Mansfeld 1986, 41-44). On 
the ‘criterion of clarity’ and Aristotle’s use elsewhere of the theologoi, see Palmer 2000. 
51 Water=Oath, Oldest=Most Honoured, Oath=Most Honoured; therefore Water=Most Hon-
oured and therefore Water=Oldest, i.e. water is the archê. Not a valid syllogism for class inclusions, of 
course, but these are identities.
52 Thus Frede 2004, for instance, overstates the extent to which Aristotle is concerned in Metaph. A 
3 or elsewhere to ‘make a clear cut’ between the philosophers and their predecessors. Palmer 2000 and 
Sassi 2002, 66-70, offer more nuanced views. Palmer 2000, 182 indeed makes a strong case for the claim 
that “it is not the case that for Aristotle the history of philosophy begins with Thales.” 
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poets look down on and take no care for us, is taken from a text whose influ-
ence on A 3 I have already noted (and will return to), Plato’s proto-doxography 
in the Sophist: there it is complained that the earlier philosophers were unclear, 
with the same sarcastic suggestion that this shows a self-involved contempt for 
their audience.53 Moreover, Aristotle’s main complaint here is that the mytholo-
gists – and philosophers like Empedocles – are arbitrary in their deployment 
of causal principles. And this criticism presupposes that we can legitimately 
attribute to the mythologists just the same kind of theoretical claims as the 
philosophers. This presupposes that the question left hanging in A 3 – is it 
legitimate to interpret the mythologists in such a way that their works yield 
doxai equivalent to those of the philosophers? – is in fact to be answered in the 
affirmative. (The same also seems to be assumed in Metaph. Λ 6 and N 4.) The 
exercise is not illegitimate; the problem is rather that it is usually pointless. For 
once we have extracted doxai from the poets, there is no way for us to ‘cross-
examine’ them for their reasoning, unlike the philosophers. (I will have more 
to say about Aristotle’s dialectical examinations of ‘witnesses’ in section VI.54) 
Homer may well have had opinions on some of the same questions as Thales, 
and that they were allegorically expressed is not an insuperable barrier to in-
terpretation. What Homer did not have was an argument. The lengths to which 
Aristotle has just gone in reconstructing arguments for Thales points up the 
importance of this contrast for him.
Now why would Aristotle bother with this excursus, given that it leads no-
where but a mental shrug? Two answers suggest themselves, and they are com-
plementary. First, Aristotle is throughout A 3ff. very interested in the question 
of who discovered what first. This is one of the most obvious respects in which 
his project in A 3ff. is, broadly speaking, a historical one -- and continuous with 
other Peripatetic exercises in historiography, which even included the writing 
of ‘heurematographies’.55 (I discuss this further in section (VI).) Hence for in-
stance the mooted regression back to Hesiod at the start of A 4. But, second, it 
also seems highly plausible that Aristotle is here again responding to his source, 
the doxographical text of Hippias. Though we do not know as much as we 
would like to about this work on ‘related ideas’, it clearly emphasised  continui-
53 Both passages use ôligôrêsan and deny that the earlier thinkers worried [phrontizein] about our 
understanding (Sophist 243a6-7; Metaph. 1000a10-1). Frede 2004, 43 notes the parallels.
54 Cf. also 988b17 on the use of earlier philosophers as ‘witnesses’, and Eudemian Ethics 1216b26-35, 
discussed below. The basic criticism here goes back at least as far as Plato’s Protagoras, where Socrates 
retroactively rejects Protagoras’ proposal that they discuss ethical issues via the poets. Poets cannot be 
interrogated about what they say; people interpret them differently and these conflicts can never be 
decided. So we should set the poets aside and test our own logoi in discussion (Prot. 347e-8a).
55 See Zhmud 2006.
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ties between the poets and the philosophers. Aristotle is here considering and 
rejecting that approach. In doing so he is performing not a demarcation of phi-
losophy from poetry, but rather a demarcation of his own historical method from 
the indiscriminate, florilegium-like doxography of the sophist.
It is in turning back from the poets to Thales that Aristotle finally mentions 
Hippo – who, I have argued, is likely the real originator of the hydromonistic 
ideas presented earlier. He does so with an abrupt sideswipe: “Hippo no one 
would think worthy to include with these <thinkers> [meta toutôn], because of 
the shoddiness [euteleia] of his thought” (983b4a3-5). Air and fire will each get 
a pair of advocates: Aristotle here considers the possibility of adding Hippo to 
round out the hydromonist team, and rejects it. There is an odd air of thinking-
aloud here, especially marked because the ‘these’ [toutôn] has no antecedent – 
the question is clearly not whether Hippo should be ranked with the theologoi, 
who anyhow have just been dismissed. Rather the toutôn looks forward: Aris-
totle is speaking as if he has already listed the other monists he is about to name, 
or as if he already has such a list (literally?) in view. This suggests that we should 
once again consider Aristotle’s engagement here with predecessor texts.56 We 
already have good reason to believe that the excursus into the poets is a re-
sponse to a counterpart passage in Hippias’ work on related ideas. Now we 
have no direct evidence that Hippo was included in Hippias’ work. However, 
the fragment of Hippo on sea water is from a scholion to Iliad XXI.195, where 
it is introduced as coming from the third book of Crates’ Homeric Studies57 and 
is followed by a standardized claim that Homer ‘said the same thing’. And we 
might well wonder how Crates, a scholar and (probably Stoic) philosopher 
of the second century BC, came by Hippo’s ipsissima verba on this particular 
point. Content and context here point to the same answer. For that Homer is 
in agreement with the natural scientists as regards Ocean is, after all, just the 
point which Snell traced back to Hippias’ work on related ideas. And Mansfeld 
has noted that to make this point Hippias must have practised something very 
like allegorical interpretation and that the Stoics may well have drawn on his 
allegories for their own.58 
56 I do not mean the phrase ‘predecessor text’ to imply anything about exactly how Aristotle used 
either Hippias or the Sophist. But I do mean suggest a closer relation than would be conveyed by ‘source’. 
These texts do not just supply Aristotle with raw materials; their mode of presentation has detectable 
effects on his own. 
57  “Then in the third book [of his Homeric Studies] he says that the later natural scientists also agreed 
that the water which surrounds the earth for most of its extent is Ocean, and that fresh water comes 
from this.” Trans. Barnes 1987.
58 “It is therefore entirely possible that at least some of Hippias’ quotations were taken over by the 
Stoics, and that they lived on in the professional literature explaining the poets, or the Poet, as well as 
176 Rachel Barney
Given this consonance of content and function (and the virtual exclusion of 
Hippo from the mainstream of non-medical doxography), I would suggest that 
Crates’ source is almost certain to have been Hippias or some closely derivative 
text.  And this is worth factoring back in to our reading of A 3, for it entails that 
Hippo figured in the work which we have already seen is Aristotle’s source for 
the excursus. If we grant that Aristotle’s source is Hippias in [b], and then in 
the excursus as well, it becomes very plausible that he is also the source for the 
rest of the hydromonist reasoning [c]-[g] which comes in between (and which 
I have already argued should be attributed to Hippo). Finally, it is then natural 
to suppose that Aristotle’s belated praeteritio of Hippo is prompted by the text 
he has been using all along.59 In explicitly excluding Hippo, Aristotle is doing 
just the same thing as in the excursus: responding to Hippias’ indiscriminateness 
with a correction, and a raising of the doxographic bar. If this is on the right 
track, then the whole of the present passage represents a sustained engagement 
with this crucial predecessor text, one involving both considerable appropria-
tion of material and half-submerged methodological critique. As I noted in (II), 
and will argue further in (VI), the other text which has this complex intertex-
tual role in A 3 is Plato’s Sophist. I do not want to speculate, hopelessly, about 
the physical details of Aristotle’s methods of composition.60 But it is clear that 
his work here is marked by ongoing access, recourse and responsiveness to both 
texts (or, perhaps, extracts or other derivatives of them) – the equivalent of, in 
our time, having them open on his desktop.
All this helps to explain what would otherwise be something of a puzzle, 
Aristotle’s gratuitous praeteritio of the hydromonist Hippo. It is, after all, always 
simplest just not to mention what one considers undeserving of mention. No 
doubt Hippo irritates Aristotle both as a materialist about the soul (scorned in 
De Anima) and as a throwback: a belated material monist who does not fit into 
the progressivist story told here. But this does not explain why Aristotle bothers 
to name him, and it remains hard to see why Hippo should be singled out for 
scorn when Diogenes of Apollonia, for instance, is not. The natural explana-
in the doxographical accounts” (1985a, 143). We cannot be sure that Hippias cited Iliad XXI, 195-6, but 
it would have been extremely pertinent (cf. Guthrie vol. 1, 60; Mansfeld 1983, 88 n. 17, 90, 93 n. 35). 
Xenophanes 21B30, also on the ocean as source, follows almost at once in the Geneva scholia ad XXI, 
196. Patzer 1986 agrees that DK38B1 would have fit Hippias’ purposes in relation to the locus discussed 
by Snell. 
59 Patzer 1986, 40-1 also finds it likely that Aristotle’s reference to Hippo is prompted, in a polemical 
spirit, by his inclusion in Hippias 
60 Frustratingly little is known of the practicalities of Greek reading, writing and reference in Ar-
istotle’s time or earlier. For discussion of these questions see the work of Tiziano Dorandi, including 
Dorandi 1997.
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tion is that Aristotle is here responding critically to the inclusion of Hippo in 
someone else’s text: and we can make a very good guess as to who that someone 
was. I will come back to this question at the end, when I try to draw some 
conclusions about the mix of genres in A 3.
4.  Enumeration of the early materialists
“Anaximenes and Diogenes set down air as prior to water and the first principle 
above all, among the simple bodies; Hippasus of Metapontium and Heraclitus of 
Ephesus set down fire; and Empedocles the four <elements>, adding earth to those 
already mentioned as a fourth (for <he says> these always remain and do not become, 
except in quantity or smallness, being combined into one and separated out of one). 
Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, who was prior to him in age but later in his works, says 
that the first principles are infinite.  For he says that almost all the homogeneous 
bodies, like water and fire, come to be and are destroyed through combination and 
separation alone; otherwise they are not generated or destroyed, but remain eternally.” 
(984a5-16) 
Aristotle’s enumeration here involves a complex layering of systematic and 
chronological ordering principles. Overall and at the highest level, A 3-6 pro-
ceeds systematically, by a division [diairesis] into the four types of cause offered 
as archai. But these causes are discussed in their chronological order of discovery. 
Within the discussion here of the first of these causes, the material, this or-
ganizational pattern – first systematic division, then chronology – is reproduced 
locally. The systematic progression is from one archê, to many (Empedocles), to 
infinitely many (Anaxagoras). This diairetic sequence (used also at Physics I.2) 
seems to have a powerful hold on Aristotle’s thinking about the archai; in order 
to execute it, he departs from the birth order of Anaxagoras and Empedocles,61 
overshoots Parmenides, and outruns his initial plan inasmuch as Anaxagoras 
and Empedocles should not count among the materialists advertised at 983b6-8. 
61 The interpretation of the contrast here has been controversial: for the term translated as meaning 
that Anaxagoras was later [husteros] in his activity might equally well be read as expressing philosophical 
inferiority. Of the two, Aristotle does seem to have the higher opinion of Empedocles (see O’Brien 
1968). On the other hand, 984b15-20 does not entail that Anaxagoras’ work cannot have been later 
than Empedocles’; and it is hard to see why Anaxagoras’ inferiority would be relevant here, least of all 
as an excuse for discussing him after Empedocles. If anything, given the progressivist orientation of A 3, 
Aristotle’s presentation should be in order of ascending merit. For recent discussion and references, see 
Menn (ms), Sider 2005, 3-11 and Curd 2007, 130-7, as well as O’Brien 1968 and Mansfeld 1979-80. For 
our purposes the important point is fortunately the unambiguous one: Aristotle is warning that birth-
order and diairetic order have here come apart, and that he has deviated from the former.
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Thus Aristotle must soon backtrack to Parmenides (an odd combination of 
monist and dualist, 984b3-4) and the discovery of the moving cause. (This pro-
lepsis of Empedocles and Anaxagoras cannot be an attempt at completeness 
in listing material archai, since the atomists and Platonists remain offstage until 
much later: rather Aristotle is setting out the range of kinds of answer to the 
diairetic question, ‘how many archai?’.) Finally, at the lowest organizational level, 
the same layering of organizational principles is reproduced within the setting 
out of the monistic positions. We again get a systematic division of the candi-
date archai by type, into water, air and fire; but these are listed in chronological 
order of introduction; and the internal ordering of at least two pairs, Thales-
Hippo and Anaximenes-Diogenes, is surely chronological.62 
So reliance on chronology features at multiple levels in the construction of 
Metaph. A 3. (It also explains why, having decided to begin with Thales, Aristotle 
immediately wonders whether he should move back to earlier thinkers still.) 
And in this A 3 continues a chronological perspective adopted before the outset 
of the predecessor survey: for in A1 and A2, Aristotle muses repeatedly on the 
origins of philosophy, in order to identify wisdom with non-utilitarian knowl-
edge (A 1, 981b14-24) and non-productive science (A 2, 982b11).
This interleaving of chronological and systematic principles is perhaps de-
veloped from Aristotle’s predecessor text here, the proto-doxography of Plato’s 
Sophist. As I noted in (II), at 242c, the Eleatic Visitor launches into a somewhat 
jokey sketch of earlier thought about ta onta, posa te kai poia estin:
“It strikes me that Parmenides and everyone else who has set out to determine how 
many real things there are and what they are like, have discoursed to us in rather 
an off-hand fashion.... They each and all seem to treat us as children to whom they 
are telling a story. According to one there are three real things, some of which now 
carry on a sort of warfare with one another, and then make friends and set about 
marrying and begetting and bringing up their children. Another tells us that there 
are two – Moist and Dry, or Hot and Cold – whom he marries off, and makes them 
set up house together. In our part of the world the Eleatic set, who hark back to 
Xenophanes or even earlier, unfold their tale on the assumption that what we call 
‘all things’ are only one thing. Later, certain Muses in Ionia and Sicily perceived that 
safety lay rather in combining both accounts and saying that the real is both many 
and one and is held together by enmity and friendship.”63
62 Why Hippasus precedes Heraclitus is a mystery, since Heraclitus is standardly taken to be the ear-
lier of the two figures. (For detailed argument that Hippasus should be assigned a birth date of roughly 
510-500 B.C., see von Fritz 1945, 242-5.) Aristotle never explicitly refers elsewhere to Hippasus, and 
so little is known of him that it is hard to guess what non-chronological basis Aristotle might have for 
listing him first – apart from his distaste for Heraclitus.
63 Trans. Cornford 1934.
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The specifics of Plato’s story here are admittedly very different from the narra-
tive of A 3, and in some respects rather baffling. Here monism seems to be an El-
eatic invention (though the Eleatics here include Xenophanes), contrasted with 
unattributed three- and two-archai cosmogonies of a vaguely mythological, 
Hesiodic character.64 The upshot is a ‘countdown’ diairesis from three archai to 
two to one (a form also found in another important ur-doxography, Isocrates, 
Antidosis 268), followed by synthetic views. But this is also presented in part 
chronologically, with the Ionian and Sicilian Muses being marked as later than 
the Eleatics, and the origins of the latter movement noted, albeit vaguely. (It is 
tempting to further suppose that the three- and two-archai theories are pre-
sented first as being pre-Eleatic; but there are no explicit chronological markers 
here.) Despite the very different content of his story, Aristotle in A 3 seems to 
be looking back to the Visitor’s account, as I noted in (II). The question here too 
is ‘how many and of what sort’, as pursued through an investigation of being: 
and though his topic is the archai, Aristotle is concerned to keep his account 
in contact with the Platonic reading of the same tradition as one about einai 
and ta onta. Both Plato and Aristotle combine diairetic ordering principles with 
chronological ones, and indeed Aristotle follows Plato in positing a division 
into three ‘phases’ (though in Plato, as I have noted, the first two are not neces-
sarily chronologically ordered). They are the three phases, indeed, that we still 
find in standard histories of Presocratic philosophy, viz materialists, Eleatics, and 
a post-Parmenidean synthesis. 
5. The Progress of Inquiry and the Discovery 
of the Moving Cause
“From these one might think that the only cause is the one mentioned as belonging 
to the material type. But as they advanced in this way, the facts themselves showed 
them the way and joined in forcing them to investigate. For however much all de-
struction or generation may be from some one or even many, why does this happen 
and what is the cause? For at any rate the underlying substrate itself doesn’t make 
itself change. I mean, for instance, that neither the wood nor the bronze is a cause of 
each of them changing, nor does the wood make a bed nor the bronze a statue, but 
something else is a cause of the change. To investigate this is to search for the other 
cause, as we would say, that from which comes the beginning of motion. Well then, 
those who at the very beginning touched on this subject, and said that the underlying 
substrate was one, didn’t give themselves a hard time about it; but some of those who 
64 Cornford ad loc. is silent on the identities of the two- and three-archai theorists. Pherecydes is 
often mentioned as a candidate for the latter: but see the cautious remarks of Schibli 1990, 195-6.
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said it was one, as if defeated by this inquiry, say that the one and nature as a whole 
is unmoved, not only in respect of generation and destruction – for this is an ancient 
<view> and they all agreed on it – but also in respect of all other change. And this is 
peculiar to them. So then it turned out that none of those who said that the universe 
was one grasped a cause of this sort, except perhaps Parmenides, insofar as he set 
down causes not only as one but also in a way two. But indeed for those who make 
<the universe? the first principles?> many, it is more possible to give an account <of 
such a cause>, for instance for those <who posit as archai> hot and cold or fire and 
earth. For they treat fire as having a motion-causing nature, but water and earth and 
the like in the opposite way.” (984a16-4b8)
This section of the chapter is shaped by a pair of fascinating but somewhat 
enigmatic statements at 984a18-9 and – running beyond the scope of this paper, 
but clearly somehow paired with the former – 984b8-11. The second reference, 
after the account of Parmenides and the unnamed pluralists, is as follows:
“After these <thinkers> and first principles of this kind, since they were not adequate 
to generate the nature of things, the truth itself, as we said, again compelled inquiry 
into the next kind of cause.” 
I will call this pair of assertions the internal logic claim.65 It is controversial 
whether the second allusion describes a second intervention, prompting in-
quiry into the final cause, or is just a recapitulation of the first. Ross argues that 
the ‘next’ [echomenê] kind of cause must still be the efficient one (1958, 135-6), 
a reading supported by Aristotle’s retrospective summations at 985a11 and b21. 
But that does not entail that nature intervenes only once (which would re-
quire, awkwardly, taking the ‘again’ with the ‘as we said’), or that final causality 
is not at stake here – it certainly seems to be in view in the ensuing discus-
sion (984b11-14). Ross offers a subtle explanation: “while the inquiry ‘what set 
things changing?’ did not lead to the notion of a distinct efficient cause, which 
is the proper answer to that inquiry, the question ‘why are things well ordered?’ 
did lead to that notion” (1958, 136). So reality was forced to prod the Preso-
cratics twice. The first jab was largely ineffectual, since Parmenides and others 
simply redeployed a preferred material cause as efficient. The second was effec-
tive – perversely so, however, since the puzzle which should have disclosed the 
final cause instead resulted in the belated discovery of the efficient one. This 
65 For a much more nuanced discussion of the internal logic claim – of how exactly the phenomena 
and puzzles to which Aristotle here alludes are supposed to have shaped the thought of various groups 
of Presocratics -- see Gabor Betegh’s contribution to this volume. My concern here is with the basic 
methodological presuppositions of any such claim, and the implications for Aristotle as a ‘historian of 
philosophy’.
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reading, with its failures of fit between puzzles and solutions, seems to me very 
helpful in accounting for the ambivalent, confusing character of these passages. 
This striking and hugely important claim – that philosophical progress in 
uncovering the causes was somehow enforced by the subject-matter itself, and 
so was presumably necessary or inevitable – seems to occur nowhere else in 
Metaph. A (though the allusion in A 5 to Parmenides’ having been compelled 
by the phainomena themselves seems akin, 986b31). Variants on this claim do 
appear occasionally in other works of Aristotle. One is in a closely parallel 
context in Physics I, after Aristotle’s review of his predecessors on the ques-
tion of the number and nature of the principles. The moral drawn from this 
survey is that the principles must be contraries: for all identify their elements 
and principles with the contraries, “giving no reason indeed for the theory, 
but constrained as it were by the truth itself ” (188b27-30). Then in PA. both 
Empedocles and Democritus are said to have been led to recognise the formal 
cause or essence in spite of themselves. Empedocles, “led by the truth itself ”, 
was “compelled” [anagkazetai] to identify the nature of a thing with the ratio 
(642a18-21). And Democritus, because he was “carried away by the matter [or 
facts, pragma] itself ”, was the first to touch on the essence and definition of 
substance (642a24-8). These references are a curiously close match to the two 
versions of the internal logic claim in A 3, of which one, likewise, refers to the 
truth [aletheia] as forceful agent and the other to the subject-matter [pragma] 
itself. But, oddly, what is said to be compelled in Parts of Animals is recogni-
tion of the formal cause, to which the internal logic claim is never applied in 
Metaph. A. Indeed, strictly speaking, in A 3 what is compelled is not recogni-
tion of any cause, but only further inquiry or search [zêtêsis]. In the internal 
logic claim as it appears in A 3, Aristotle’s claim is not that particular aspects of 
reality force us to acknowledge them, but rather that a partial grasp of reality 
makes further explanatory puzzles irresistible.66 He clearly has a point, with the 
first version of the claim especially: given the continuity and stability provided 
by a persisting archê or archai, why does change happen just when it does?
66 Unfortunately Aristotle does not spell out how it does so. In addition to Gabor Betegh’s discus-
sion in this volume, a suggestive account is presented by Irwin 1988, 158: “<the material monists> have 
to explain the variation of non-essential properties at different times; and they cannot simply mention 
the permanent subject and its composition, since these alone do not explain why the changes happen 
at some times and places rather than others.... Even though they do not initially recognize the efficient 
cause, their own questions, not some questions raised by another theorist from within quite a different 
theory, require the recognition of an efficient cause”. This is an attractive picture of how philosophical 
investigation might progress as a series of self-propelling problems and solutions. The difficulty is that 
it presupposes that Aristotle’s monists were all along trying to explain ‘the variation of non-essential 
properties’, and it is not clear to me to what extent this was (or was seen by Aristotle as) their focus. 
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As scholars have noted, the internal logic claim must be an expression of 
two more general Aristotelian views. One is his understanding of the devel-
opment of the arts and sciences as following a teleological and even cyclical 
progression.67 Aristotle holds that all the arts and sciences have been devel-
oped and perfected many times, with the epochs of human culture divided 
and destroyed by recurrent natural disasters. Fragments of wisdom somehow 
survive in mythic form to provide the starting-point for the next civilization 
(cf. Metaph. Λ 8). And the development of a science within each epoch exhibits 
something like the teleological progress to perfection characteristic of natural 
organisms. (Indeed, according to Cicero at Tusc. III.28.69, Aristotle thought that 
the final completion of philosophy was fast approaching.) This is presumably 
because of the second view, Aristotle’s ‘epistemological optimism’. We are natu-
rally adapted to opt for the true over the false: humans “have a sufficient natural 
instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth” (Rh. 1355a15-8; cf. 
E.E. 1216b28-31; EN. 1098b27-9; Pol. 1264a1-4). This general orientation to the 
truth implies that (barring special countervailing factors of some sort) good 
explanations will tend to drive out bad, the false parts of theories will tend to 
be corrected by their successors, and the sciences, philosophy included, will 
tend naturally towards completion. The link between this epistemological opti-
mism and Aristotle’s progressivist conception of philosophy is made explicit in 
Metaph. α 1, which reads like a retrospective gloss on the project of A 3-10. As 
this crucial text explains, the investigation of the truth is in a way hard, but in 
another way easy. While no one gets the whole picture right, “no one fails en-
tirely, but every one says something true about the nature of things, and while 
individually they contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a 
considerable amount is amassed” (993b1-5). Contributions to the arts and sci-
ences build on each other and all are of value (993b11-19). So it is not surprising 
that Aristotle would tend to view progress in thinking about the archai as virtu-
ally inevitable – if anything, the puzzle would be that he does not present the 
internal logic claim more often, in a wider range of contexts. 
All this helps to explain some of the distinctiveness of Metaph. A 3ff. vis-à-
vis Aristotle’s other predecessor surveys. As I noted at the outset, A 3 is unique 
in its emphasis on chronology, which is apparently irrelevant to his purposes in 
(say) De Anima I. The obvious explanation is that A 3 is special because of the 
application here of the internal logic claim. In this case, but not the others, Ar-
istotle has a clear story of progress to tell, one in which the historical sequence 
67 Mansfeld 1985b, 3-10; Palmer 2000, 196-202.
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of inquiries and discoveries takes on a life of its own.68 Admittedly this is not 
a fully satisfying explanation: what we would like to know, of course, is why 
thought about the archai would have been uniquely self-propelling in this way. 
Frustratingly, so far as I can see, A 3-10 offers no answer to that question. Per-
haps we can speculate that the most general and explanatory features of reality 
(the first causes and principles), which are also the most knowable by nature, are 
therefore the most able to provoke the inquiry which discovers them. But Ar-
istotle never quite says so, or explains exactly how this ‘compelling’ takes place. 
6. Conclusions: Dialectic and the History of 
Philosophy in A 3 
As I noted at the outset, Aristotle’s predecessor-surveys, and Metaph. A 3ff. in 
particular, are naturally read as accounts of the endoxa (as per EN. 1145b3-7), 
and as instances of the kind of philosophical dialectic which yields support for 
first principles.69 But Aristotle’s practice in A 3 is only an imperfect fit with his 
programmatic remarks elsewhere, and with his full account of dialectic in the 
Topics. Moreover, Aristotle’s next move in Metaphysics B is to set out aporiai, 
an operation which still belongs to dialectic, rather than to proceed to a sys-
tematic science of metaphysics. 70 So if A 3-10 is dialectic, it is of a kind which 
is preliminary even in relation to the equally dialectical investigations which 
follow. 
What sort of dialectic A 3 should be counted as can be brought out by 
further comparison with Plato’s Sophist. I have already noted the parallels be-
tween Sophist 242cff. and A 3 as surveys of accounts of the primary beings or 
first principles, ‘how many and of what sort’ they are. But in terms of method, 
A 3 is still more indebted to the second phase of Plato’s doxographic discussion, 
Sophist 246a-9d. In this famous passage, ‘the battle of the gods and the giants’, 
two views are expounded and scrutinized at much greater length: a kind of ma-
terialism and what sounds very much like the middle-period theory of Forms. 
68 Cf. Frede 2004, 13-4.
69 On Peripatetic doxography as dialectic more generally, see Mansfeld 1992 and Baltussen 1992.
70 So the Metaphysics shows that a predecessor-review and a working out of aporia are, or at least may 
be, distinct dialectical operations (whereas in Physics I, say, they seem to be combined, cf. I8, 191a23-5). 
Aristotle concludes in A 10 with a reference to what sound like two distinct sets of aporiai (993a24-7). 
The identity of these is controversial, but at any rate those of A 8-9 are clearly a completion of the 
predecessor-review, whereas the aporiai of B are forward-looking. See John Cooper’s discussion in his 
contribution to this volume.
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The Visitor launches into a critical dialogue with each faction in turn. This 
involves positing ‘improved’ materialists, who are willing to answer ‘in a more 
orderly way’ than their real-life originals. In defense of this idealization, the 
Visitor notes that agreement from these improved interlocutors is worth more 
anyway; and that our concern is not really with them but to seek the truth. 
In the interrogation which follows, each faction is forced to concede, on the 
basis of its own thesis in conjunction with further non-rejectable premises, the 
contradictory of that initial thesis. The Giants must admit that there are non-
perceptible and by extension non-bodily existents. The Visitor then proposes 
to them a new criterion of being, one coherent with this newly expanded on-
tology: being is power [dunamis], the ability to affect and be affected. This new 
criterion can plausibly be claimed to be what the giants ‘really’ had in mind all 
along: for it would explain why they latched on to body as coextensive with 
reality, and also why they readily accept that the qualities which affect bodies 
must also exist. The friends of the Forms, conversely, must concede that Being 
is subject to motion and change: only in doing so can they can properly satisfy 
their underlying theoretical desideratum, of showing that Being is known. 
The form of each argument is thus that of a Socratic elenchus with an absent 
or reformed interlocutor, and with a positive upshot affirmed. And this upshot 
– that while both change and rest really exist, Being must be understood as 
different from both of them – generates the basic framework of the account 
of the ‘greatest kinds’ which the Visitor goes on to develop. Each side can thus 
be seen to have a positive contribution to make to that framework, once its 
one-sidedness is corrected. The materialists were right that what exists must 
have powers to act and be acted upon (a point to be pressed again at 252c-e); 
but they were wrong to assume that such powers could only be exercised by 
bodies. The friends of the Forms were right that what really is must be know-
able and stable, but wrong to assume that this entailed complete stasis. As each 
is corrected, they converge on the correct account; and Plato presents this as 
something that they – or their idealized counterparts – could be brought to 
recognise themselves, through a literary simulacrum of dialectical question-
and-answer. This question-and-answer is at once refutative and constructive; 
though superficially elenctic, it is also oriented towards sifting the true from 
the false, collecting insights which the correct theory can regiment into their 
proper places. 
In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle describes a dialectical procedure along very 
much the lines displayed in the Sophist:
“We must try, by argument, to reach a convincing conclusion on all these questions, 
using, as testimony [marturiois] and by way of example, what appears to be the case. 
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For it would be best if everyone should turn out to agree with what we are going 
to say; if not that, that they should all agree in a way and will agree after a change 
of mind [metabibazomenoi]; for each man has something of his own to contribute in 
relation to the truth, and it is from such <starting-points> that we must in a way 
demonstrate: beginning with things that are correctly said, but not clearly, as we pro-
ceed we shall come to express them clearly, with what is more perspicuous at each 
stage superseding what is customarily expressed in a confused fashion.” (1216b26-35, 
trans. Woods 1992 revised)
The ‘change of mind’ [metabibazein] envisaged here seems to be the kind of 
dialectical clarification and correction we find in the Sophist: as we move from 
confusion to clarity, everyone can be shown to (‘in a way’) agree, just as the 
idealized and reformed Gods and Giants come to do. The same point is brought 
out, again with metabibazein, at Topics 101a33: dialectic is useful in ‘encounters’, 
“because if we have correctly reckoned up the opinions of the many, we will 
speak to them not from foreign opinions but from their own, making a change 
[metabibazontes] to anything they seem to us not to have said well”.71  This 
‘change’ must again be the kind of idealization or reform which makes con-
fused views usable and ultimately convergent in dialectical discussion: as Smith 
says, “replacing our audience’s clumsy formulations of their own views with 
better ones we have worked out in advance” (1993, 351).72
The kind of dialectic on display in the Sophist, and delineated in these Aris-
totelian texts – clarification-dialectic, we might call it – is, I think, what Aristotle 
also brings to bear in Metaphysics A 3-10. A progression from the confused to 
the clear and corrected is precisely what he here aims to offer: “But while he 
would necessarily have agreed if another had said this, he has not said it clearly”, 
as he says of Empedocles’ approach to the formal cause in A 10, 993a22-4. That 
everyone, once their views have been fully clarified and adjusted, has a distinc-
tive contribution to make to the truth is then thematized in Metaph. α 1. The 
idea of ‘testimony’ or ‘witnessing’ is crucial to this  procedure (cf. A 7, 988b16-
18), and reveals its essentially Socratic origins. As Socrates says to Polus in the 
Gorgias, in discussion he knows how to do just one thing: how to make his 
interlocutor and opponent bear witness or testify to the truth of his (Socrates’) 
views, despite his own initial affirmation of a contrary view (471e-2c). In doing 
71 In his only other use of metabibazein, in Topics VIII, Aristotle insists that someone who wants to 
metabibazein correctly must do so dialectically rather than eristically (161a33-4). Metabibazein is also used 
at Phaedrus 262b5, for step-by-step dialectical misdirection; cf. also Plato’s uses at Gorgias 517b5 and Laws 
736d4 (again for small incremental redirections).
72 Cf. also Smith 1999, with a discussion of metabibazein on 3-4: “Getting everyone to agree with 
our view after a ‘change of mind’ means leading each person, from premises he accepts, to accept our view” 
(4).
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so, Socrates’ elicits the interlocutor’s real beliefs, which lurk under his contrary 
avowed ones – for instance, that doing injustice is worse than suffering it.
So my claim is that A 3ff. belongs to a small but important set of Platonic 
and Aristotelian texts which exemplify clarification-dialectic: a species of argu-
ment which consists in a critical, dialogic examination of the views of others, 
in the course of which their implications are extracted, what is false refuted, 
and what is true identified for constructive use. Though clarification-dialectic 
is critical, the extent to which it is refutative (rather than a subsumption and 
harmonization) seems to vary. In Metaph. A 3-10, the emphasis is on finding the 
distinctive, though incomplete, contribution to the truth made by the views 
under examination. In the Sophist (and perhaps De Anima I) the emphasis is on 
criticism and correction, and the discussion is elenctic in form; but there is still 
a profoundly important positive upshot. In two other cases I would tentatively 
adduce, the refutation of Protagoras in the Theaetetus and Metaphysics Γ, virtu-
ally nothing survives the examination, and the path to first principles is pointed 
only by negation. But these differing outcomes represent variations, not so 
much in the method as in the value of the views examined.
This mode of argument deserves the name of dialectic for several reasons. It 
is clearly a descendant of the Socratic elenchus. As per Aristotle’s own account 
of dialectic, it deals with endoxa (specifically the views of the wise), and takes a 
dialogic form (to the extent that a written engagement with one’s predecessors 
can do so). It is a preliminary stage of inquiry, and a useful non-demonstrative 
way of getting clear about prospective archai, as per the dialectic of the Topics 
(cf. Topics I.2).73 At the same time, clarification-dialectic does not seem to be 
quite identical with the dialectic discussed in the Topics (or for that matter with 
the famous programmatic remarks of N.E. VII.174).75 But then, in my view, it 
is difficult if not impossible to fit together everything Aristotle says about dia-
lectic, and what seem to be his own philosophical uses of it, into a satisfactory 
73 Also, as we can see from A 3ff. itself, clarification-dialectic is the kind of enterprise for which a 
collection of doxai would be a necessary resource, and Mansfeld 1986, 25 has noted that such collections 
are proposed for dialectic in Topics I.14; cf. Mansfeld 1992.
74 No doubt A 3ff. is preparatory to the consideration of aporiai, and might thus be classed as an 
elaborate way of tithenai ta phainomena; but it is hardly the case that the rest of the Metaphysics is simply 
concerned to vindicate as many of those phainomena as possible.
75 Strictly speaking, according to Topics I.12, a dialectical argument is either an induction [epagôgê] or 
a deduction [sullogismos]: I see no good way to read A 3 as either. Moreover, the dialectic described in 
the Topics (most of the Topics, anyway) seems to be essentially refutative, while clarification-dialectic also 
has a constructive function and a positive upshot. But how far all Aristotelian dialectic is supposed to be 
refutative in form, how the refutative dialectic of Topics VIII is related to any broader genre, and whether 
the Topics is actually consistent are all, to me, very murky questions. Cf. Brunschwig 1967, esp. xxix-xxx 
on the refutative character of dialectic, and Smith 1993 and 1999.
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unitary conception. 76 Be that as it may, and whether or not ‘dialectic’ is really 
the word for it, something like clarification-dialectic remains a canonical mode 
of historically informed philosophical argument.77
We are now in a position to clarify the question I put to Ross at the outset: 
if A 3ff. belongs to the genre of clarification-dialectic, might it not also and the 
same time be an exercise in the history of philosophy? For clarification-dia-
lectic is clearly not the only genre in play in A 3: it does not explain Aristotle’s 
emphatic and many-leveled use of chronology as an organizing principle. 
This chronological emphasis cries out to be seen in a broader context. We 
have plenty of evidence of Aristotle’s deep and sustained interest in certain 
kinds of historical questions, about the history of the sciences in particular.78 
We know that his students and successors researched and wrote histories of 
philosophy, mathematics, medicine and theology; moreover, these histories be-
longed to a still broader project of research into the development of civilization, 
commonly put in terms of the prôtos heuretês, the ‘first discoverer’ of various 
arts and ideas – the subject, apparently, of a whole Peripatetic genre. A general 
engagement with history of all kinds also led Aristotle and his followers to as-
semble collections of constitutions, political histories and chronologies.79 In the 
face of all this it seems perverse to insist that history cannot be what Aristotle 
is concerned with in Metaph. A 3 – as if he might have had a comprehensive 
interest in every kind of history except the history of philosophy.80 Perhaps the 
phrase ‘history of philosophy’ now imports norms which A 3 does not attempt 
to meet -- though this seems to me highly debatable, given how contested the 
76 I cannot here engage with the rich and complex reading of Aristotelian dialectic offered in Irwin 
1988. But if I am right to connect the method of Metaphysics A and Γ with the Eudemian Ethics and the 
Sophist, the gap between the Topics and the dialectic of the Metaphysics is not primarily to be explained 
in developmental terms. For a contrasting, restrictive view of what Aristotelian dialectic amounts to, cf. 
Smith 1999.
77 For instance, in her Tanner lectures, The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard constructs 
an account of normativity in part by way of engagement with such predecessors as Grotius, Hume 
and Kant. I have elsewhere compared Korsgaard’s eirenic history here with Simplicius’ Neoplatonic 
harmonizations of earlier philosophers (Barney 2009). This is not a coincidence: as I argue there, this 
mode of argument is both natural to historically informed philosophizing and, in Simplicius’ case, an 
Aristotelian inheritance. 
78 See Zhmud 2006 for a full account, especially Chapter 4.
79 Ibid., 136-40. 
80 Cf. the sensible Jaeger 1937, 354, contra Cherniss 1935: “We must not separate Aristotle’s interest 
in the history of philosophy from his historical research in all these other fields of civilization.” Zhmud 
2006 points to Aristotle’s treatise De Inundatione Nili (preserved only in a Latin abridgement), which 
gives a doxographic survey of earlier opinions on a problem which Aristotle takes to have been con-
clusively solved. Zhmud 2006, 143-4 may go too far in inferring the primacy of historical motivations in 
Peripatetic doxography; but clearly such motivations had some independent force.
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norms of ‘history of philosophy’ continue to be. Even if this is so, the more sa-
lient fact is that Aristotle’s text is deeply shaped by his concern to establish who 
first did what when – by the historian’s concern to tell the story of his subject. 
Like clarification-dialectic, progressivist narratives are alive and well in con-
temporary history of philosophy. And at a more detailed level, a number of 
Aristotle’s moves look very familiar.81 Aristotle worries about scanty evidence 
and calibrates his claims to reflect the quality of his information (983b22, 4a2). 
He refers us to the texts in support of his claims, occasionally with a slight air 
of bluff (985b2-3). He offers charitable interpretations of Empedocles (985a4-
10) and Anaxagoras (984b14-9), and a rational reconstruction of Thales. He 
implicitly critiques and corrects the methods of a crucial predecessor (Hippias). 
If Aristotle is not a historian of philosophy, it is remarkable how many of the 
historian’s problems, worries, and stratagems he has managed to accumulate. 
A final marker of genre deserves special mention. This is Aristotle’s praet-
eritio, discussed in section III, of poor old Hippo. I argued earlier for reading 
this as a reaction against the presence of Hippo in the text of Hippias; but it also 
serves a positive function for Aristotle, as part of the construction of a specifi-
cally historical genre. It is not just that, as a belated monist, Hippo is unhelpful 
to the storyline. It is also that to present a historical narrative is necessarily to 
select; and to select among philosophers is to construct a canon. Aristotle’s ex-
plicit exclusion of Hippo serves to signal this undertaking of canon-formation. 
Moreover, in avowing that the exclusion is based on the inferiority of Hippo’s 
thought [dianoia], rather than the falsity of his doctrine [doxa] (or the crude-
ness of his expression, or his belatedness, or any other consideration), Aristotle 
avows that his canon will be governed by considerations of philosophical merit. 
This too should look familiar if not downright modern. For to be objective as 
a critic and historian of philosophy means respecting just this distinction be-
tween doxa and dianoia, and giving a fair assessment of philosophical arguments 
whether or not we agree with their conclusions. Thus any telling of the his-
tory of philosophy as a progressive narrative depends on a certain faith that the 
quality of a philosopher’s dianoia will roughly correspond to his historical im-
portance. When he drop-kicks Hippo out of canon and narrative alike, Aristotle 
affirms this optimistic presumption. At that moment he announces himself as 
something fully recognisable only in retrospect: the first historian of philosophy.
81 In the terms of Rorty 1984, these features place Metaph. A 3 in the category of both rational 
reconstruction and (‘Whiggish’) Geistesgechichte.
